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ABSTRACT 
 
In a globalising economy, territories and not just firms increasingly find themselves in 
competition with each other. In fact, differently from the case of countries, cities and 
regions compete, on the international market for goods and production factors, on the 
basis of an absolute advantage principle, and not of a comparative advantage principle; 
this means that no efficient, automatic mechanism  – like currency devaluation or 
prompt flexibility of wages and prices - may grant each territory some role in the inter-
national division of labour, whatever its relative performance. 
 
Competitiveness of territories emerges as a central issue, in order to secure employment 
stability, benefits from external integration, continuing growth of local wellbeing and 
wealth. The arguments put forward by Paul Krugman, defining the concept of 
competitiveness wrong and misleading, cannot be accepted in a territorial – regional and 
urban – context. 














1.  Introduction 
 
In an era of globalisation, the issue of territorial competitiveness is of 
increasingly central importance for regional development policies. This 
paper aims to deal directly with the issue from a theoretical viewpoint, in 
particular examining two related questions more thoroughly: the question of 
the soundness of the concept of territorial competitiveness itself in terms of 
economic theory and the question of the new foundations on which this 
competitiveness is based, using a cognitive-evolutionary type approach. 
I feel this to a large extent as a counter-argument, due to the fact that the 
concept of competitiveness, referring to the national level, has been strongly 
challenged by a well-known authority on international  economics, Paul 
Krugman (1998), who has been dedicating an increasing amount of attention 
to the issue of spatial development. His sceptical and provocative comments 
have perplexed experts in the field of regional economics as to their validity 
in more restricted contexts than the national context (International Regional 
Science Review, 1996;  Urban Studies, 1999) but they have never been 
explicitly and analytically evaluated in a critical way; so it appears right to 
state that the theoretical legitimacy of the concept still remains uncertain. 
The argument proposed here asserts that the concept of territorial 
competitiveness is theoretically sound, considering not only the role that the 
territory plays in providing competitive “environmental” tools to individual 
companies, but especially the role that it plays in the processes of 
knowledge accumulation and in the development of interpretative codes, 
models of co-operation and decisions on which the innovative progress of 
local companies is based. In particular, a primary role is played by processes 
of “collective learning” (Camagni, 1991a; Capello, 1999; Keeble, 
Wilkinson, 1999): these processes result in a “socialised” growth of 
knowledge, which is embedded not only in the internal culture of individual 
companies but, particularly, in the local labour market (or, as used to be said 
in the past, in the local industrial atmosphere). 
This conclusion is supported by different aspects of the economic 
concept of “territory”. It is at the same time: 
                                                                 
1 This paper builds upon the presentation made by the author at the High Level Seminar on 
“Spatial development policies and territorial governance in an era of globalisation and 
localisation”, organised by the OECD and the National Land Agency (Japan), Paris, 10-11 
april 2000 
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-  a system of localised technological externalities, i.e. an ensemble of 
material and immaterial factors which, thanks to proximity and the 
resulting reduction in transaction costs involved, can also become 
pecuniary externalities; 
-  a system of economic and social relations, which make up the relational 
capital (Camagni, 1999) or the  social capital  (Putnam, 1993; World 
Bank, 2001) of a certain geographic space, and 
-  a system of local governance, which brings together a collectivity, an 
ensemble of private actors and a system of local public administrations. 
The second argument proposed regards the fact that some laws that 
govern the economics of inter-national trade do not operate at the sub-
national level, and this once again makes the concept of territorial 
competitiveness relevant. I refer in particular to the Ricardian principle of 
comparative advantage, which assigns a role to every country in the 
international division of labour, whatever may be the level of efficiency and 
of competitiveness of its productive sectors. I maintain, however, that at the 
more finely detailed territorial level - and therefore in economies open not 
only to trade but also to the movement of factors – the principle that governs 
production, specialisation and trade is an absolute advantage principle; if a 
certain level or rate of growth in competitiveness is not assured, the fate of 
that economy may be crisis, depopulation and desertification. 
Therefor, it does not seem unreasonable to claim that territories compete 
with one another, both to attract direct foreign (or external) investment and 
in defining a productive role for themselves within the international division 
of labour, without any automatic assurance of such a role. Both 
attractiveness and local competitiveness depend on similar common factors, 
which are not only found in physical externalities, accessibility or 
environmental quality, but also in relational capital and the learning capacity 
expressed by the territory. It is obvious that individual companies are the 
entities that compete and act in the international market, and that their 
innovativeness can never be separated from the presence of a Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur; but these companies and these entrepreneurs are to a large 
extent generated by the local context and, in order for them to govern and 
live with uncertainty, their decision making processes are firmly based on 
socialised processes and/or explicit collective action . 
 
 
2.  Globalisation and localisation 
 
This theoretical reflection is strictly tied with the debate on the spatial 
effects of the globalisation process, intended as the increasing planetary 
integration of markets for goods and services, markets of such production 
factors as technologies and information and markets of location sites for 
economic activities (Scott, 2001; Camagni, 2001a).  
In this field, two opposite and extreme positions confront each other. On 
the one side, the pessimistic one, merging (and sometimes adding up) 
different and disparate concerns, from the survival of local cultures to the 
fear about the economic and political power of multinational corporations, 
from the possibility of environmental dumping to the challenge of emerging 
countries to employment levels in rich countries. On the other side, the 
optimistic, “don’t worry” position, claiming that open markets have   5 
sufficient self-adjusting mechanisms to ensure local wellbeing and that the 
law of comparative advantage will assure each country a role in the 
international division of labour, no matter which could be its international 
competitiveness.  
On the political side, what has been called “localisation”, namely “the 
growing desire of people for a greater say in their government” (World 
Bank, 1999) through higher levels and effective ways of participation in 
decision-making (OECD, 1999a) derives exactly from a growing feeling of 
insecurity by citizens about the capability of governments to take care of 
them and rightly interpret their needs. In fact, globalisation hits in many 
respects their lives, destroying the shelters once provided by physical space 
(local captive markets), by local specificities (consumption and production 
habits), local organisational models, “patriotism” of local firms. On the 
other hand, national governments increasingly give up policy tools that in 
the past proved effective, from monetary policies (attributed to supra-
national authorities, managing wide - optimal? - currency areas), to fiscal 
policies (due to tight budget constraints), from exchange rate policies (in 
monetary unions) to many industrial policies (replaced by common supra-
national regulations and trade agreements). Concerns are real, at least 
because they in fact exist, and are rational under many respects, as it will be 
shown later in the paper; demands for greater participation and  regional 
federalism are also perfectly correct, the danger residing in possible policy 
outcomes totally oriented towards defensive attitudes, separatism and 
closure - the regional equivalent of national protectionism. 
On the purely economic side, one may judge opportunities and threats 
generated by globalisation as equivalent, balanced and therefore neutral in 
terms of spatial effects. But this judgement changes radically if one 
considers some new, qualitative aspects of the present international 
economic p icture: the increasing importance of knowledge factors, of 
immaterial elements linked to culture, taste and creativity in present 
economic processes and the characteristics of what could be called the 
production function of these elements and the ways of their accumulation. In 
fact, these immaterial elements develop through slow learning processes, 
fed with information, interaction, long term investments in research and 
education (Amin, Wilkinson, 1999; Keeble, Wilkinson, 2000). Like all 
learning processes, they are inherently localised and cumulative, as they 
embed in human capital, interpersonal networks, specialised and highly 
skilled local labour markets and local innovative milieux (Camagni, 1991b; 
Lundvall, Johnson, 1994; Asheim, 1996). 
When analysed in an international perspective, technical progress ceases 
to be a public good, perfectly mobile and accessible to everybody; on the 
contrary, it circulates rapidly only inside some restricted networks, as it 
requires high quality immaterial assets in order to be properly adopted and 
its profits appropriated (Savy, Veltz, 1995, Introduction). “While firms can 
access an increasing stock of codified knowledge, they require greater 
investments in tacit knowledge, such as human capital, management and 
organisation, to derive tangible benefits from technological change and 
innovation. (…) Firms may now benefit less from imitation and ‘free’ 
technology spillovers, as they require substantial investments in innovation 
and in co-operation and networking to access the stock of global 
knowledge” (OECD, 1999b, p. 3).   6 
We see here a complex dialectics and confrontation between the hyper-
mobility of some production factors and the territorial “anchorage” of some 
others, which act as crucial location factors for the more advanced 
production processes. The likely result is the cumulative strengthening of 
the centripetal forces of growth (scale and scope economies, all sorts of 
increasing returns) and the centrifugal forces of territorial exclusion and 
decline. It is perfectly  true that technologies and capital goods may be 
marketed and utilised almost everywhere (better: they  have to be used 
everywhere, as they impose internationally shared standards in product and 
process quality) and that telecommunication networks and facilities are 
(more or less) ubiquitous, but the skills and relational capital required for 
their proper or innovative use are by no means available everywhere 
(Graham, 1999). 
Endowment with human, social and relational capital emerge as the 
sources of the competitiveness of territories, necessary preconditions to 
secure employment stability, benefits from external integration, continuing 
growth of local wellbeing and wealth. But a number of theoretical and 
operational problems stem from this issue: 
-  the actual necessity and usefulness of competitiveness policies, 
-  the possible targets and tools of such policies, 
-  the possible emergence of zero-sum games and beggar-my-neighbour 
attitudes among territories. 
 
 
3.  Territorial competitiveness: “obsession” or sound concern? 
 
For sure globalisation is raising the competitive climate within which 
firms are confronting each other. This is likely to cause important shake-ups 
in industries and on territories, as strong selection processes are being 
launched, jeopardising existing and long lasting equilibria (both in 
industries, in terms of firm structure, and on territories, in terms of 
firm/society relationships). Does this allow us to affirm that territories do 
actually compete with each other, trying to attract new firms or helping 
existing ones to stand transformations in the general economic environment, 
to survive and prosper? Are we allowed to think, in development policy 
terms, about enhancing competitiveness of territories? 
On this subject, an important debate has been carried out in the last half-
decade, thanks to the provocative argument put forward by Paul Krugman, a 
debate which was started considering the case of nations, but recently 
enlarged to regional and territorial entities
2. Given the wide differentiation 
in scientific backgrounds, logics and languages of the participants 
(international economists, business administration experts, regional 
scientists) no surprise if the result of that debate was, in my opinion, 
strikingly inconclusive, the different arguments being often added and 
juxtaposed, never really confuted, the different territorial levels being 
                                                                 
2 This last part of the debate was hosted by the International Regional Science Review, n. 1-
2, 1996 and by  Urban Studies, n. 5 -6, 1999. Krugman has recently collected his 
interventions on the subject in (Krugman, 1998).   7 
always mixed up, as if the same economic “laws” could apply equally for 
cities, regions and nations
3.  
The question at stake is not at all abstract and removed from present 
issues concerning spatial development: from the answer to it derives the 
economic rationale for development policies at the local level, addressed to 
enhancing competitiveness and attractiveness of territories, their capability 
of meeting the demand of both citizens and firms in terms of wellbeing and 
general efficiency.  
I believe consequently that a thorough reflection is worth, underlining 
the good things following from each position, but considering the entire 
issue through a unique and sound theoretical framework. 
Krugman’s provocative view is widely known. He contests the growing 
“obsession” with international competitiveness, denying, on both theoretical 
and empirical grounds, that “a country’s economic fortunes are largely 
determined by its success on world markets” (Krugman, 1998, p. 5). He 
holds that: 
•  “countries do not compete with each other the way corporations 
do”; they “do not go out of business” (p. 6); 
•  “while they sell products that compete with each other, are also each 
other’s main export markets and each other’s main supplier of 
useful imports” (p. 9); 
•  the main role of exports is to provide the means to pay for imports, 
which represent the true element that enhances local wellbeing as it 
allows the availability of goods at lower prices with respect to local 
production; 
•  following Ricardo’s textbook model in international trade theory, “a 
country will always find a range of goods in which it has a 
‘comparative advantage’, even if there are no goods in which it has 
an ‘absolute advantage’” (ibid., p. 91).  
Therefore, he argues, not only the competitiveness goal proves “flatly 
wrong”, but also “dangerously misleading”, as, whenever national 
authorities try to intervene in affecting the competitive advantage of their 
territories, they end up with a sort of neo-mercantilism, detrimental to the 
fair allocation of resources which should be based on objective elements, 
neutrally evaluated by the market. The traditional “infant industry” 
argument for justifying (temporary) protectionist policies and the more 
modern “strategic trade policies”, which justify export subsidies and 
temporary tariffs in order to let local industries “create their own 
comparative advantage, through a process of positive feed back”, including 
increasing returns and external economies (technological and pecuniary) 
(ibid., p. 96-97), are considered and accepted, as parts themselves of 
Krugman’s recent contribution to the new trade theory, but with “strong 
warning against overuse” (p. 99). 
I will take up these and others among Krugman’s arguments, 
underlining what is acceptable and fruitful in the construction of a 
theoretically sound development strategy for territories and what is not.  
                                                                 
3 The editors of the Urban Studies issue affirm: “It will be clear that  the authors 
contributing to this Review broadly believe that cities and other places compete with one 
another. (…) The consequences for national economies remain uncertain”. (Lever, Turok, 
1999, p. 792).   8 
The theoretical situation is filled with paradoxes, which partly depend on 
the viewpoint adopted (macroeconomic or microeconomic, static or 
dynamic), partly on the assumptions and hypotheses of the theoretical 
reference models (for example: full employment or non-full employment), 
partly on the complexity and multidimensionality of the concept of 
competitiveness itself 
4. Consider, for example, the most striking paradox: 
competitiveness in a macroeconomic statistical sense is measured by the 
ratio between the general level of import prices and the level of export 
prices expressed in a common currency; competitiveness therefore increases 
when the denominator is reduced (due to a devaluation or a reduction in 
export prices) and tends to generate growth in exports (in volume) and 
employment. But when you wish to measure the advantage of international 
trade for a country in terms of real income, you observe the opposite 
relationship (export prices on import prices), i.e. the terms-of-trade and in 
this case a reduction of export prices, and therefore an increase in 
competitiveness, result in a reduction of welfare 
5.  
However, the paradox can be resolved by turning to a different measure 
of competitiveness: if it is true that “it is better to sell with prices rising 
rather than falling” and that the problem consists in dealing with the 
expected fall in demand in a situation of rising prices, the answer, both 
conceptual and operative, is of increasing the attractiveness of local 
products by taking action on innovation, thereby breaking the static context, 
both conceptual and operative, of price competition. We thus come up 
against a concept of non-price competitiveness, which I shall refer to in the 
following pages. 
I will order my critical reflections in increasing order of importance, 
holding a spatial perspective, both inter-national and intra-national. 
 
a.  Krugman rightly shows us that the true purpose of trade is imports, not 
exports. Exports are a cost, the way of financing cheap imports, “which 
is worth doing because it is more efficient than producing our imports 
for ourselves” (Krugman, 1996, p. 19). Spatial division of labor  - 
including the most spectacular, between city and countryside – is based 
exactly on this principle, which allows each partner to fully exploit the 
benefits of specialization (from static scale economies to dynamic 
learning economies), increasing its own and each other’s level of 
wellbeing. But the terms-of-trade, the relative prices at which goods are 
exchanged, is highly relevant for each partner: increasing the efficiency 
                                                                 
4 When a full employment situation is assumed – resulting from flexibility in prices and 
wages  – as in the classical Ricardian model or in  neo-classical models, or when 
outmigration is considered as a beneficial re-equilibrium mechanism, as in neoclassical 
regional models, the main attention is paid to per-capita income levels, and therefore the 
favorable effects of imports on real income are underlined and devaluations opposed. When 
the possibility of non-full employment equilibria is considered and outmigration is 
considered as an economic and social cost, as in the models of broadly keynesian 
inspiration, attention is paid to income and employment growth, to the elements of 
aggregate demand and therefore the beneficial role of exports is emphasized. 
5 Even at the time of Stuart Mill the paradox called “impoverishing development” was well-
known: if, due to overall development or the development of certain export sectors, 
economies of scale are achieved and therefore export prices fall (improving 
“competitiveness”), the terms of trade worsen and, under certain conditions, the country 
could see its real income fall instead of rise (while its trading partners would benefit from 
its price falls).   9 
of the export sector means being able to import the same amount of 
goods employing a lower quantity of local resources (it is mainly the 
case of process innovation)
6, or to import more with equal utilization of 
local resources (it is the case of product innovation, product 
differentiation, etc.). Efficiency of the export sector, or competitiveness, 
maintains therefore some meaning. Is this a mercantilist attitude? Yes, in 
the positive, historical meaning of the term. Is this a zero-sum game? 
No, as a part of the increase in efficiency will result in a decrease of 
export prices (depending on the degree of competition in the sectors 
involved),  and will go consequently to the advantage of the trade 
partners.  
 
b.  Krugman rightly reminds us that one of the main constituents of local 
welfare is represented by the efficiency of the “residential” sector, 
producing goods and services for the domestic market. This is 
particularly true in a country like the U.S., in which exports represent 
about 10% of GDP. Therefore, internal productivity makes the 
difference, not external competitiveness. All this sounds right, but the 
relevance of domestic productivity for local welfare depends crucially 
on the size of the country and on its openness to international trade. 
Taking the example of a small country, like an island specialized in 
fishing or tourism, the competitiveness of the export sectors determines 
the employment level, total income level and consequently the amount 
of real local consumption, almost totally dependent on imports
7. 
European countries are 3 to 6 times more open to international trade than 
the U.S.; most firms sell both on the internal and  the international 
market; many apparently “residential” sectors, like retail trade or hotels, 
sell their services also on the international tourist market. This is why in 
these countries the two concepts of internal productivity and external 
competitiveness, which Krugman rightly keeps separate, sound much 
more similar. Furthermore, coming down to the intra-national, regional 
level, the share of external trade increases rapidly, and the efficiency of 
the exposed sectors widely determine employment opportunities and 
economic welfare of local communities (this argument will be touched 
on again later). 
 
c.  Krugman warns us against a fast acceptance of the policy implications 
of the “strategic trade theory”, to which he himself gave relevant 
contributions. In a world of increasing returns (at the firm level and at 
the level of the local milieu), where history, chance, accident and policy 
intervention explain international specialization and trade patterns better 
than factor proportions or the attributes and inherent differences of the 
single countries, strategic industrial policy could be very effective and 
justified. Krugman’s opposition in this case regards the difficulty, costs 
and risks involved in attributing a public administration the choice about 
                                                                 
6 Provided that export prices, which are defined on the whole international market, remain 
unaffected. 
7 This argument is similar to the one exposed by Thirlwall in a wellknown article 
(Thirlwall, 1980, p. 422), where he claims that “export demand is a vital element in 
regional demand, (..) necessary to compensate for a region’s appetite for imports, in the 
absence of other compensating expenditure”.   10 
sectors and products that will prove successful in the future. I think 
though that some risks are worth taking up, especially if the target is not 
a product but a technological filière, and if the strategic approach means 
taking into account the potential effects of general political decisions, 
not directly concerned with tariffs or export support. 
 
 In the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, the explicit political decision by the 
Italian government to postpone the introduction of color-tv broadcasting 
meant imposing a c ompetitive disadvantage to domestic electronic 
industry that was never caught up later, with wide negative external 
effects on the entire technological trajectory. Conversely, in many 
countries the early introduction of environmental regulations on 
emissions meant the early development of an environmental technology 
industry, taking advantage of all kinds of positive feed back effects. For 
sure, a careful assessment of alternative strategies should be made (e.g.: 
military expenditure vs. medical care and research), but it is the kind of 
evaluations that public administrations should normally make, in all 
intervention fields (like infrastructure provision, etc.). Moreover, 
intervention policies may well be horizontal, non-sectoral policies, as 
those addressed to the improvement of the quality of production factors: 
human capital, social overhead capital, regional accessibility, 
information and communication networks, to which we can add 
institutional interventions on rules and regulations. These are not 
policies targeted (selectively and “strategically”) to specific sectors, but 
may be crucial for many important ones
8. 
 
Is this neo-mercantilism? Once again, yes, in the progressive sense of 
the historical mercantilist thought and practice. We owe to the 
mercantilist view the abatement of feudal restrictions to goods mobility 
inside each country, the improvement of internal infrastructure in order 
to enhance accessibility to (national and international) markets, the 
utilization of the trade surplus in order to widen money supply, reduce 
interest rates, speed up investments, encourage entrepreneurship (Tiberi, 
1999). 
 
d.  Considering not just international trade patterns (as in international trade 
theory) but also factors movements, and international capital flows in 
particular, a competitive production system may mean not just a good 
export performance but more interestingly an international attractiveness 
with respect to both “real” and “financial” capital. This last fact may 
easily turn a potential export surplus into a trade balance deficit, 
allowing the country to pay for its (cheap) imports and for a rising 
standard of living through the international trust of the capital markets 
(present U.S. condition of external accounts comes close to this last 
picture). 
 
                                                                 
8 It is common wisdom in Italy that in the early 1980’s the development of the Milan stock 
exchange and related financial sectors were widely hampered by both the existence of 
limitations on international capital movements and by the low efficiency of communication 
networks.   11 
This is why competitiveness and technical change should never be 
hampered in an open country, through any sort of social resistance to 
change. David Ricardo, the father with Robert Torrens of the 
comparative advantage principle, even if convinced of the job-killing 
nature of technology, in his famous chapter “On machinery” affirmed: 
“The employment of machinery could never be safely discouraged in a 
State, for if a capital is not allowed to get the greatest net revenue that 
the use of machinery will afford here, it will be carried abroad, and this 
must be a much more serious discouragement to the demand for labour, 
than the most extensive employment of machinery” (Ricardo, 1817, p. 
388 of the 1971 edition)
9. Leaving the assumption of factor immobility 
of the abstract model of international trade and assuming a dynamic 
perspective, the relevance of concerns about the efficiency of the local 
production sectors vis-à-vis the other countries appears very clearly: not 
only a reduced efficiency will hamper external demand but will force 
both capital and labour to migrate, as it will be shown later on. 
 
 
4.  Absolute advantage and comparative advantage. 
 
Finally and most importantly from a theoretical point of view, there 
exists a relevant case where a position à la Krugman cannot be maintained: 
the case of interregional confrontation and competition among local 
territories. From the beginning, I want to underline that Krugman, in his 
contributions quoted here, referred explicitly to the case of nations and not 
of regions; therefore my remarks refer mainly to the subsequent debate 
among regional scientists, where the two levels, the national and the 
regional or local one, were mixed up and their profound difference as far as 
our issue is concerned never really underlined 
10. 
In my opinion, the law of comparative advantage does not hold in case 
of confrontation among local economies (inter-regional trade), and 
consequently the conclusion that each region will always be granted some 
specialisation and role in the interregional division of labour is not valid. A 
region can well be pushed “out of business” if the efficiency and 
competitiveness of all its sectors is lower than that of other regions, for the 
following reason: at the inter-regional level the two adjustment mechanisms 
that in a theoretical setting allow to pass from an ‘absolute advantage 
regime’ to a ‘comparative advantage’ one, namely price-wage flexibility and 
exchange rate mouvements, either do not work properly or do not even 
exist. On the contrary, a different, much more effective and punishing 
mechanism works, namely inter-regional migration of mobile factors, 
capital and labour. 
The reasoning is as follows. Ricardo’s model is a model of barter, which 
operates in terms of relative costs/prices of two goods in two countries; in 
this context the normative aspect of the principle (or paradox) of Ricardo is 
                                                                 
9 On this point too Krugman would probably agree. He writes: “Maintaining productivity 
growth and technological progress is extremely important; but it is important for its own 
sake, not because it is necessary to keep up with international competition” (Ibid., p. 101). 
We add that it is also important for the competitiveness of exports and for the attraction of 
foreign investments. 
10 A paper in which Krugman assumes a “regional” perspective will be considered at the 
end of this paragraph.   12 
easy to demonstrate, and states that both countries have an advantage from 
specialisation and trade 
11. 
But, passing from the normative to the positive side, can we be sure that 
the exchange will really occur? In normal practice the exchange occurs as a 
result of international operators who carry out comparisons between 
absolute prices and not between relative prices of two goods as in a barter 
(they compare the price of the same good in the two countries in a common 
currency)
12, and therefore between values in which the cost of production 
(in labour days) is multiplied by a monetary wage and by an exchange rate. 
If the more efficient country presents lower prices in all goods, how could 
the exchange take place?  
In two separate countries, between which mobility of factors is not 
possible and which are moving, in a logical sense, from a condition of 
autarchy to one of international trade, it is conceivable that, beyond a 
comparative advantage, there could also be an absolute advantage for each 
country in one of the two goods (and that therefore the absolute price, in 
addition to the relative price, of that good is lower than that in the other 
country). In fact, real wages before trade will necessarily be commensurate 
with the average productivity of each country and therefore the more 
inefficient country will have lower wages
13; but if the lower productivity is 
balanced, on the average, by lower wages, the country will show an absolute 
advantage in the good in which productivity is above average, i.e. the good 
in which a comparative advantage exists. After trade, the rate of exchange 
will be such as to assure equilibrium in the trade balance.  
So, in the case of countries, trade would occur; but what would happen 
if a disturbance caused wages to increase or the exchange rate of a country 
to appreciate? In the short term, the absolute advantage could disappear
14, 
and the country would therefore not export any goods, while it would import 
                                                                 
11 Even if a country (let it be S) has higher costs in the production of both goods A and B 
because it is more inefficient (requires, for example, 2 labour days for A and 4 for B 
compared to N which requires one day for both goods), in relative terms it will always have 
a comparative advantage in one of the goods (in this case in A) in which it is relatively less 
inefficient. Under these conditions, where the good B is traded for A at a ratio of 1:1 in N 
and 4:2 = 2 in S, if the relative price of B at the international level is fixed at an 
intermediate level, let us say 1.5, it is shown that it is an advantage for both countries to 
specialise (S in A and N in B) and to perform international trade. In N in fact, the more 
efficient country in all production, the opportunity cost of moving a unit of labour from 
producing A to producing B is 1 (one unit of A is lost), while trading the additional unit of 
product B on the international market results in 1.5 units of A; the  gain from trade is 
measured by a saving of one half labour day. The same reasoning applies for the country S: 
the opportunity cost of moving a unit of labour from B to A is ¼ B, while by trading on the 
international market the increased production of A thereby obtained, equal to ½ A, is 
possible to obtain 1/3 B (> ¼ B). In this case, the gain from trade for country S is equal to 
1/3 labour day.  
12 Ricardo himself reminds us that “every transaction in commerce is an independent 
transaction” (Ricardo, 1971, p. 157); “monetary precondition for an exchange is a 
difference in absolute costs” (Onida, 1984, p. 81; our translation). 
13 This is for the simple fact that, in terms of remuneration of factors, it is not possible to 
distribute more than is produced in real terms. 
14 Södersten (1970), illustrating the Ricardian model in the case of many sectors, states that 
“the number of goods a country will export is determined by the wage rate and by the 
exchange rate”; if they rise, the country will lose its advantage for some goods  (p. 21). He 
defines this last advantage as a “comparative” advantage (which, however, remains 
unaffected by an increase in wages or exchange rate, which act proportionately on all 
goods), while to all effects it is an “absolute” advantage.   13 
them all, generating mass unemployment. In the long term however, 
equilibrium would be re-established, thanks to two alternative equilibrating 
movements:  
i)  a “classical” mechanism of downward pressure on real wages 
and prices, triggered by the imbalance in the labour market and 
by the reduction of the money supply determined by the outflow 
of gold (to pay for the imports) (Ricardo, 1971, p. 158), and/or  
ii)  ii) a “modern” mechanism of devaluation of the exchange rate, 
triggered by the deficit in the trade balance. 
But what happens in an intra-national, territorial context? This context is 
by definition characterised by three elements which distinguish it from the 
assumptions of the international trade model:  
a)  it is not possible to assume an initial condition of autarchy as logical 
starting point, since trade between territories is the rule — between 
regions, between cities, between city and countryside;  
b)  there are movements of production factors between territories 
(commuting workers, labour and capital movements, purchases of 
estate and property assets from outside), and  
c)  a specific regional currency and exchange rate for each individual 
territory do not exist.  
The theoretical effects of these three conditions are important (when 
giving examples, reference is made to the case of weak regions): 
a’. firstly, in a macroeconomic sense, the close linkage between real wages 
and average productivity recorded in an isolated country in conditions of 
autarchy is lost. Whatever the level of monetary wages, there is no longer an 
internal scarcity mechanism in the market for goods which, through 
movements in the general level of prices, brings real wages and purchasing 
power to the level compatible with overall productivity: any excess demand 
is addressed to the purchase of external goods; 
a’’. in a microeconomic sense, the level of monetary wages contractually 
defined by companies could not be without reference to local productivity; 
but this reference is not as close as that required by the model, since: i) 
monetary wages are largely defined through collective national contracts, 
and relate to a level (and a growth) of average national productivity (if not 
those of the most advanced regions) and not those of weak regions; ii) when 
the lower average productivity of a region is due to factors external to 
companies (poor accessibility, low quality of public services), in order to 
keep local products competitive workers should accept monetary wages 
lower than their “factory” productivity, and this is unrealistic in a context 
where migration is logically and practically permitted, and where the level 
of prices of most goods consumed locally is at the “international” or “inter-
regional” level (monetary wages lower than the national average would 
therefore also result in lower real wages). Wages in weak regions would 
therefore not fall to the levels required to assure external competitiveness in 
at least some products; 
b’. if, due to the two preceding points, a region possesses an absolute 
disadvantage in all goods, and therefore suffers from rising unemployment 
and deficit in its trade balance, it could see this condition stabilised in time 
and not re-equilibrated by automatic mechanisms. Taking it to an extreme 
conclusion, it is in fact possible to conceive of a territory that does not 
produce or export anything and lives on imports, where income and internal   14 
purchasing power are assured by various alternative possibilities: by the 
income of commuting workers, by the sale of wealth or capital assets to 
foreign residents (houses, land, properties), by public transfers (pensions, 
unemployment benefits) or private transfers (remittances from emigrants). 
In this territorial context therefore, the imbalance in the trade balance does 
not represent a macroeconomic constraint; 
b’’. a situation such as that outlined above is clearly not sustainable in the 
long term, but in a context of factor mobility, adjustment would occur more 
rapidly and more likely through emigration and depopulation rather than 
through a fall in real wages 
15 . Both capital and labour, receiving lower than 
average remunerations in a region as a consequence of inefficient 
production conditions, whenever they will cease to be supported by external 
territories or by the national government through loans, income transfers or 
subsidies, they would promptly emigrate in search for better employment 
conditions 
16. Factor immobility is therefore crucial for the validity of the 
comparative advantage principle 
17; 
c’. the national exchange rate - assuming that it is linked only to trade 
movements and that the balance of capital movements is therefore in 
equilibrium at a national level - is defined by a weighted average of the 
regional trade balances, in general comprising “strong” regions, tending to 
be net exporters, and “weak” regions, tending to be net importers 
18: the 
former are thus in a situation of a relatively undervalued exchange rate, and 
the latter in a situation of a relatively overvalued exchange rate, which does 
not favour their exports; 
c’’. in a dynamic context, assuming an initial situation of inter-regional 
equilibrium (with each region specialising in some good), if one region sees 
its productivity (and competitiveness of export sectors) increase at a lower 
rate than that of other regions, given similar wage dynamics (defined at 
national level), it would see its competitive advantage decline and disappear 
and it would not be able to use the obvious instrument available to countries, 
                                                                 
15 It is not intended to suggest here that a “real wages” effect is not set in motion; but that, 
given the conditions of openness to foreign trade (“international” prices of imported goods) 
and to factor mobility, this effect would not be sufficient or predominant. 
16 Going back to the example in foot-note 11, if a unit of good B is internationally traded 
for 1.5 units of A, country N, specialised in B, exchanges one internal labour day with 3 
labour days of S, thanks to the difference in productivity levels. But, as stated by Ricardo, a 
similar situation cannot exist in the case of two regions of the same country: “The labour of 
100 Englishmen cannot be given for that of 80 Englishmen (…). The difference in this 
respect, between a single country and many, is easily accounted for, by considering the 
difficulty with which capital moves from one country to another, to seek a more profitable 
employment, and the activity with which it invariably passes from one province to another 
in the same country” (Ricardo, 1971, p. 154). 
17 Mark Blaug, presenting Ricardo’s principle, explicitly argues: “The point of Ricardo’s 
analysis is to show that the conditions that make international trade possible are quite 
different from the conditions under which domestic trade would arise. If England and 
Portugal were two regions in the same country [and the former were less efficient in all 
productions], all capital and labour would migrate to Portugal and both goods would be 
produced there. Within a nation, trade between two places requires an absolute difference in 
costs but a comparative difference is a sufficient condition for the existence of international 
trade” [our italics]  (Blaug, 1997, p. 120). 
18 In terms of macroeconomic accounts, strong regions generally show a trade surplus, 
balanced by higher taxes, fewer public transfers, a higher savings rate and a deficit in the 
balance of capital movements (what Kindleberger has called “mature creditors”); weak 
regions generally show opposite behaviour.   15 
devaluing the exchange rate. For the reasons already outlined, real wages 
would also not be flexible enough, and the region could therefore find itself 
without any specialisation or export sectors. 
In conclusion: due to their intrinsic openness both to the movement of 
goods and movement of factors, regions and local territories operate in a 
context of inter-regional trade within a regime of “absolute advantage” and 
not within a regime of “comparative advantage”
19. If their absolute 
competitiveness is inadequate or declining with respect to the other regions, 
the spontaneous adjustment mechanisms which in the latter regime always 
assure a role in the international division of labour  - even  to countries 
structurally inefficient in all production sectors - either do not exist or are 
inadequate to re-establish equilibrium. Weakness conditions, due to 
inadequacies in production factors, adverse geographic circumstances or 
poor accessibility, may well result in mass unemployment and, if public 
transfers of income are not sufficient, emigration and possible abandonment.  
The real world is full of cases where rich exporting regions coexist with 
poor regions (having a trade deficit), with strong long-term divergence in 
the levels of unemployment, since equilibrium in macroeconomic accounts 
is reached through the equalising role of national fiscal policies or 
interregional movements of capital. 
There are three possible strategies of development or survival for 
underdeveloped territories: carry out political lobbying aiming to secure 
public transfers (a strategy that is merely defensive, costly and to be 
rejected); improve the competitiveness of the local system, or attract 
investment from other regions and abroad. So, it is right and quite justifiable 
in a theoretical sense to be concerned with competitiveness and 
attractiveness, two goals that are becoming ever more relevant in the context 
of the European Monetary Union, where different countries find themselves 
in a situation like regions of a single country. 
In a paper about “regional” development experience in the U.S. and the 
effects of adverse shocks on the specialisation sectors of the single States, 
Krugman looks to reflect along similar lines. In case of factors immobility, 
usually assumed in international trade theory, long term growth of a region 
hit by an adverse shock could benefit from wage and factor cost decreases, 
attracting new activities from outside. But, he argues, in case of factor 
mobility, the usual situation in an interregional context, “an unfortunate 
region will not have lower factor prices for very long: capital and labour 
will move to other regions until factor payments are equalized. This means 
however that there is no particular reason to expect a region whose 
traditional industries are faring badly to attract new industries. It can simply 
shed people instead ( …) The story is one in which the point is not the 
existence of a strong force for divergence, but the absence of a force for 
convergence of output and employment (factor prices and per capita income 
do converge)” (Krugman, 1993, p. 248). “If New England had been a 
sovereign country, it might have devalued its currency and/or pursued an 
expansionary monetary policy. In fact, not only were these options not 
                                                                 
19 Presenting the theory of interregional trade and specialisation, Armstrong and Taylor 
affirm: “That trade is based on comparative advantage and not absolute advantage is 
universally accepted and rarely tested” (Armstrong, Taylor, 2000, p. 123). In my opinion, 
this statement, when referred to regions, should not be accepted at all.   16 
available, but a budget crisis forced fiscal policy to move in a pro-cyclical 




5.  The sources of territorial competitiveness 
 
Let us consider now in more depth the logic underlying the role of 
exports and foreign investments in regional contexts, and the elements that 
can enhance competitiveness and attractiveness of territories. I can see here 
five main points: 
•  Exports are seen in all regional economics textbooks as the triggers of 
multiplier effects and drivers of local development. In a short-term view 
we can stay with this position, which sees demand as the driving force of 
the economy; but over the long-term, and if we wish to explain 
territorial development, the short-term view is no longer adequate and 
we have to identify the reasons for a prolonged growth of exports: we 
have to look at the sources of competitiveness, that is supply side factors 
20. 
In order to export, local firms have to show a higher competitiveness 
with respect to external firms, and territories some form of “absolute” or 
competitive advantage
21. Better: this competitiveness should reside on 
dynamic elements, allowing the continuous recreation of the l ocal 
advantage, through a flow of radical and incremental innovation 
(Camagni, 1996, ch. 5). On which elements does this capability fund 
itself? Increasingly, at least in the case of advanced countries, 
endowment of natural resources and relative availability of traditional 
factors like labour and capital play a minor role 
22. What really count 
nowadays are two orders of factors and processes: in an aggregate, 
macroeconomic approach, increasing returns linked to cumulative 
development processes and the  agglomeration of activities
23; in a 
                                                                 
20 Using demand models such as that of Thirlwall (1980) to explain development – 
admittedly an elegant model, of relevance in a short-term approach – does not appear to be 
acceptable. The conclusion of the model that the development of a (small) region depends 
on the rate of growth of the world economy and the income elasticity of external demand 
for its exports (in addition to, inversely, the income elasticity of internal demand for 
imports) is in fact a true but banal statement, which only considers the deterministic and 
less interesting side of territorial development. It completely ignores the primary factor of 
productivity/competitiveness (which in these models only serves to mechanistically define 
the growth rate of employment once GDP growth is defined); however, this factor can 
readily generate local development even in a context of static global demand.  
21  Porter’s concept of ‘competitive advantage’, developed outside the context of 
international trade theory, is close to the concept of absolute advantage. It can be usefully 
adopted, as its author does (Porter, 1990, 2001), to reflect about territorial competitiveness.  
22 As factor endowment tends to become more homogeneous among (advanced) countries, 
international trade itself increasingly concerns similar products exchanged in the two 
directions, diversified by thin, qualitative elements (intra-industry or “two-way” trade). 
23 We can distinguish at least three families of models interpreting these processes: 
cumulative models of regional development based on productivity growth and increasing 
returns, from historic ones (Kaldor, 1970; Dixon, Thirlwall, 1975) to more recent ones 
(Krugman, 1991); cumulative models based on factor migration and the creation of a 
growing local market, from Myrdal (1957) to Krugman (1991); and models based on the 
creation of vertically integrated industrial complexes, from Perroux (1956) and Isard (1960) 
to Krugman and Venables (1995).   17 
microeconomic and microterritorial approach, the specific advantages 
strategically  created by the single firms, territorial synergies and co-
operation capability enhanced by an imaginative and pro-active public 
administration, externalities  provided by local and national 
governments, the specificities historically built by a territorial culture
24. 
As it is clear, in the latter case - which is more interesting for us - they 
are all artificial or created advantages, open to the pro-active, voluntary 
action of local communities and their governments. 
•  Local firms rely not only on public goods, human capital and social 
overhead capital, but increasingly on selected external assets and 
“specific resources” that cannot be easily obtained via spontaneous 
market developments. Therefore firms are increasingly engaged in a co-
operative process with other local firms, (collective) actors and the 
public administration for the conception and provision of these resources 
(Colletis, Pecqueur, 1995; Cooke, Morgan, 1998). 
•  Particular territorial conditions, determined by a particular richness of 
inter-firm interactions or “untraded interdependencies” (using Michael 
Storper’s expression) (Storper, 1995), may facilitate cooperation among 
firms and social actors and generate cumulative learning processes 
enhancing the innovativeness and the competitiveness of the local 
territorial system. A good way of depicting this process is through the 
concept of innovative milieu, developed by GREMI
25 (Aydalot, 1986; 
Camagni, 1991b; Ratti et al., 1999). In a turbulent environment 
characterized by difficulty in information collection, processing and 
assessment, strong interdependence between the decisions of different 
actors and great complexity in the  external environment, economic 
actors find in the local milieu the necessary support for coping with 
uncertainty. In fact the milieu – consisting of shared values, common 
representations and codes, a strong sense of belonging, trust, common 
professional background and economic specialization  - helps by 
facilitating three crucial tasks of a cognitive nature (Camagni, 1991a; 
Camagni, 1999):  
- the transcoding of external information, its selection and evaluation – a 
crucial task in innovative processes  - allowing more accurate 
interpretation and a faster utilization in decision-making and in 
developing new business ideas. This occurs in many ways, including 
informal contacts, imitation, mutual assessment of “rumors” and so on; 
in a word, it occurs through a “socialized” or “collective” process; 
                                                                 
24 As Porter puts it: “Increasingly, the drivers of prosperity and economic policy are moving 
to the microeconomic level  – to the capabilities and behavior of units below the whole 
economy such as individuals, firms, industries and clusters. (…) There is growing 
recognition that company success also has much to do with things that are outside the 
company”, such as “supplier relationships and the benefits of partnering” (Porter, 2001, p. 
140. 
25 The GREMI - Groupe de Recherche Européen sur les Milieux Innovateurs - chaired by 
the present author, is an international group of scholars located in Sorbonne University, 
Paris, for the purpose of studying innovative environments.  The ‘innovative milieu’ is 
defined as the set of relations uniting a local production system, a set of actors and their 
representations, and an industrial culture, which together generate a localized dynamic 
process of collective learning. Some of the basic constituent elements of the local milieu 
are: mobility of specialised labour within the local labour market, innovation imitation, 
interfirm co-operation and linkages, common codes and conventions, and a common sense 
of belonging.   18 
- the  ex-ante coordination of private decisions in order to permit 
‘collective action’, both in business behavior and in the provision of 
public or collective goods 
26; 
- the supply of the permanent substratum for collective learning 
processes. Learning processes require a host of tacit, immaterial, and 
informal exchanges, which happen mainly  inside large firms. But an 
interesting parallel to this process exists, in the case of the local milieu: 
in this case the learning processes develop mainly outside the individual 
firm (which is small and generally short-lived), but  inside the local 
labour market, through the chains of professional upgrading, the 
mobility of skilled labor inside the area and the density of customer-
supplier co-operation relations. The local milieu - which can be either an 
industrial district or a city - becomes the substratum in which long term 
“collective” learning processes are embedded to the advantage of the 
local economy (Capello, 1999; Camagni, Capello, 2002).  
These effects are in part spontaneously generated, representing an 
important basis for the local increasing returns, and in part dependent 
upon specific and explicit cooperation among local actors, requiring 
some form of local governance. In both cases, the competitive weapons 
reside more outside the single firms than inside them, i.e. more in the 
local milieu than in a specific firm located in its geographical space. 
•  Local territories and milieux compete and co-operate with each other, 
building their own comparative or competitive advantages. This is good 
for the entire economy if we hold the view of a “generative” 
development process taking place from below, rather than a process 
quantitatively defined at the macroeconomic level and then attributed in 
a “competitive” way to each territory (only in this last case would the 
efforts developed by the single territories result in a zero-sum game in 
relation to the competitive distribution of a predefined pay-off).  
Cities in particular, given their nature of clusters of public goods and 
externalities, enhancers of interaction and local synergy, and given also 
the political accountability of their elected administration, may be 
considered competing actors on the global scene. 
•  Firms use locations as competitive tools, and increasingly use global 
mobility to optimize production and distribution costs. Location 
territories, on the other hand, are not just the passive objects of location 
decisions by firms, but communities made up of economic subjects 
which act in their own interest by trying to keep or attract firms. 
Workers, subcontracting firms, suppliers of intermediate inputs, services 
and factors, are all agents which can achieve their goal not just by 
competing on prices and wages with other communities (sites), but also 
by upgrading the quality of their service through direct or indirect tools 
which involve the community and the local public administration. 
                                                                 
26 Some of the main obstacles  to collective action are considered, by economic theory, to 
be the cost of information collection and the risk of opportunistic and free-riding behavior. 
In both cases, the existence of a local milieu limits these costs, thanks to geographical and 
organizational proximity, trust and the establishment of common codes for co-operation 
and for the punishment of improper behavior. When these costs reveal themselves to be 
excessive, the public sector may be called on to enforce some of the rules or contribute 
directly to the development and implementation of local schemes; its visibility, accessibility 
and accountability with respect to the local community reinforces the synergetic effect. 
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Locations are in a sense bought and sold on a global market, where 
demand and supply confront each other. 
In synthesis. For sure, globalisation enhances the competitive climate in 
which firm operate.  In order to cope with this condition, and with the 
consequent increasing level of dynamic uncertainty (about markets, 
technologies, successful organisational models), firms more and more rely 
on high-quality human capital, on devices or “operators” allowing fast 
information assessment and transcoding, and on forms of co-ordination and 
co-operation. As a consequence, directly or indirectly, through explicit 
locational decisions or through the selective effects of competition, they 
favour and support those territories that supply these new “relational” 
factors.  
But if individual firms and individual people undertake collective 
activities, facilitated by (and creators of) trust and local social capital; and if 
significant cognitive synergies, readily apparent in the local milieu, result 
from their various interactions; and finally if these actions and these 
processes draw additional vitality from cooperation with local public 
administrations; then it appears justifiable to go beyond methodological 
individualism - which regards only single firms as operating and competing 
- arguing the logical validity of a ‘collective’ concept such as that of 
territory, and to affirm that territories compete among themselves, using the 
creation of collective strategies as their instrument. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
In a globalising economy, territories and not just firms increasingly find 
themselves in competition with each other. In fact, differently from the case 
of countries, cities and regions compete, on the international market for 
goods and production factors, on the basis of an  absolute advantage 
principle, and not of a comparative advantage principle; this means that no 
efficient, automatic mechanism may grant each territory some role in the 
inter-national division of labour, whatever its relative performance. 
Therefore, weak and lagging territories - in terms of competitiveness of 
the economic fabric, internal/external accessibility, quality of the human and 
environmental factors, internal synergy and learning capability  – risk 
exclusion and decline to a larger extent than in the past. Particularly in the 
present techno-economic phase, witnessing the increasing importance of 
knowledge factors, of immaterial elements linked to culture, taste and 
creativity, the innovative utilisation of the existing stock of codified 
knowledge and technologies requires greater investments in tacit 
knowledge, human capital, management and organisation, co-operation and 
networking; in a word, it requires conditions that are rare and not at all 
ubiquitous.  
Hopefully, the way towards territorial competitiveness, engaging public 
administrations and local communities in the creation of a widening 
spectrum of “preconditions” – from hard to soft, from competitive to co-
operative ones – does not mean at all a wasteful zero-sum game, as: 
•  competitiveness reached through territorial quality and public service 
efficiency brings benefits to all local economic activities, both 
originating from inside or from outside;   20 
•  competitiveness reached through spatial specialisation means widening 
roles for complementary specialisations, developed in complementary 
territorial contexts; 
•  competitiveness reached creating local synergies among actors, or 
integrating and embedding external firms into the local relational web, 
exploits technological and organisational spillovers and generates 
increasing returns that are at the very base of economic development, in 
its “generative” sense. 
In these conditions, roles and responsibilities of the local development 
policies and spatial planning widen, facing new political and cultural 
challenges. Integrating economic and spatial goals; integrating different 
sectoral tools; stimulating local co-operation networks and partnerships; 
guaranteeing a real and effective participation of people and citizens to the 
construction of territorial ‘visions’ and strategies; enhancing local 
competitiveness through appropriate policy tools addressed to collective 
learning and local relational capital; all these new tasks represent relevant 
challenges and ask for a rapid evolution of our models of territorial 
governance (Camagni, 2001b; Guigou, Parthenay, 2001). 
Coming back to the central theoretical issue of the present reflection: 
external competitiveness matters in a regional and urban context. “Pop 
internationalism”? I would rather claim: vox populi, vox dei (“Pop voice, 
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